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Polarizationa b s t r a c t
This paper explores how unequal resources and social and economic polarization affects
the size of social networks and their use to access resources. We argue that individual
resource position generates divergent expectations with regard to the impact of polariza-
tion on the size of networks on one hand, and their usefulness for accessing resources on
the other. Social and economic polarization encourages reliance on informal networks, but
those at the bottom of the social structure are forced to rely on more extensive networks
than the wealthy to compensate for their isolated and underprivileged position. At the
same time, social and economic polarization limits the resources the poor can access
through their networks. We provide evidence consistent with these propositions, based
on data derived from the International Social Survey Programme 2001 ‘‘Social Networks’’
dataset combined with contextual information on the levels of economic inequality in
particular countries along with whether they experienced postcommunism.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Increasing concern with growing income inequality and declining social cohesion has led to a number of studies exploring
the negative effect of inequality on various dimensions of social capital, such as political and civic participation and informal
sociability (Pichler and Wallace, 2009; Solt, 2008; Lancee and van de Werfhorst, 2012). This research has demonstrated that
in addition to depressing social interaction and participation, increasing inequality magniﬁes differences in civic and political
participation between those at the top and those at the bottom of the social structure. Existing studies have not, however,
examined the effect of inequality and polarization on properties of social networks, such as their size and their use to access
resources. Networks form the core of the structural component of social capital (Gesthuizen et al., 2013), but research
remains inconclusive regarding who uses them most and with what results.
The unique contribution of this paper is its focus on the effect of income inequality and social polarization on the size of
networks and their use to access resources. Research on the effect of inequality in social status on social capital claims that
those at the bottom of the social structure are also impoverished in terms of the extensiveness and quality of their social ties,
which results in institutionalization of their underprivileged position (Böhnke, 2008; Lancee and van de Werfhorst, 2012; Li
et al., 2003; Pichler andWallace, 2009; Solt, 2008). However, none of these studies analyzes the actual size of networks or the
access to resources these networks may provide, instead using proxies such as informal sociability or frequency of contact
with friends and family members. Moreover, existing research provides little insight into how polarization and inequality
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has focused on the effect of growing income inequality, it has largely overlooked other examples of social polarization, such
as what occurred during and as a consequence of the rapid socioeconomic transformation to democracy and market econ-
omy in the postcommunist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). To address these shortcomings is the aim of this
paper.
Social ties tend to arise spontaneously as a by-product of social activities and the contexts in which individuals operate
(Cattell, 2001; Gesthuizen et al., 2009), but there is extensive literature on how social networks are shaped and used stra-
tegically as a source of resources (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1990; Lin, 2001; Portes, 1998). We depart from this literature
and analyze the effect of inequality and social polarization on the size of networks and their use to access resources. We
argue that individual resource position generates divergent expectations with regard to the impact of inequality and social
polarization on network size on one hand, and the use of networks to access resources on the other. Social and economic
polarization encourages the use of informal networks, but those at the bottom of the social structure are forced to maintain
more extensive networks than those at the top to access resources they need. At the same time, high social and economic
polarization limits the resources they can mobilize through these networks. We provide evidence consistent with these
propositions, based on the largely underutilized International Social Survey Programme 2001 ‘‘Social Networks’’ dataset,
which was designed speciﬁcally to study social networks and social support from the cross-national perspective. We com-
bine these data with contextual information on the levels of inequality in particular countries, along with their experience of
postcommunism. Our ﬁndings show that under conditions of high income inequality and in postcommunist societies the
poor maintain networks that are at least as extensive as the networks of wealthier groups. Yet these networks are less useful
to them for accessing resources, such as substantial amounts of money or information about employment opportunities,
than they are for the wealthy. Our ﬁndings help to explain why the poor, despite maintaining large social networks, are
unable to use them as an avenue out of poverty.2. Social networks as a source of resources
The point of departure for us is the individual-level approach to social networks as a source of resources, based on the
notion of exchange and reciprocity in social and economic relationships (Paldam, 2000; Portes, 2000). In this approach a cru-
cial function of networks is to compensate for the lack of private assets by providing information, but also by helping to
acquire more tangible goods, such as employment or conventional capital (de Graaf and Flap, 1988; Narayan and
Pritchett, 1999). People invest in network relationships—giving gifts and providing favors—and expect future returns from
these investments (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1990; Lin, 2000). Networks are used to access other people’s assets, so these
assets may be labeled as ‘‘social network capital’’ (Granovetter, 1995). To possess social network capital, one has to be linked
to others, and these others are the source of one’s advantage (Burt, 2000; Coleman, 1990; Portes, 1998). However, having an
extensive network of relationships does not mean that one will generate any signiﬁcant resources from those connections, as
how effectively networks serve their function depends on one’s socioeconomic position and the context in which the
networks operate. Below, we discuss these factors in turn.2.1. Stratiﬁcation of social networks
Social network properties differ across social groups. Classic studies, such as Campbell et al.’s (1986), show that socioeco-
nomic status positively affects the range and composition of social networks (for a review, see Lai et al., 1998). More recent
literature focuses on informal sociability and formal participation, using these indicators as a proxy for network intensive-
ness and/or extensiveness.1 These studies, apart from analyzing the effect of socioeconomic position on sociability and partic-
ipation, introduce the mediating effect of context. For example, using Eurobarometer data Pichler and Wallace (2009) show that
both extensivity and intensivity of formal and informal contacts differ depending on social class/occupational position and level
of income inequality; they conclude that lower social classes are less endowed with both formal and informal social capital and
that these differences become more pronounced when income inequality rises. Lancee and van de Werfhorst (2012) show that
inequality in terms of income translates into inequality in the frequency of socializing with friends and relatives and participa-
tion in associations, and that overall levels of income inequality further amplify these differences. Solt (2008) shows a similar
effect for political participation. That the poor are less likely to join formal associations and this effect is particularly pronounced
in countries with high income inequality has also been demonstrated by Karakoc (2013), using a sample of postcommunist
countries.
Although not studying social networks directly, these studies come to three general conclusions that they apply also to
social networks: (i) differences in social network size should be attributed to differences in resources and social integration
between social groups; (ii) these differences are more pronounced where social and economic distances between groups are
larger, as under conditions of high economic polarization; and (iii) overall, high economic polarization weakens social capital1 Pichler and Wallace’s study (2009) is an exception in that they try to capture not only intensivity but also extensivity of networks. However, their
summated variable of binary measures of meeting/not meeting socially with (a) friends, (b) colleagues, and (c) neighbours does not fully capture network
extensiveness.
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distance between the poor and the wealthy generates resentment and anxiety, which limit interactions between these
groups (Herreros, 2004; Taylor-Gooby, 2013; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). They also refer to the principle of homophily:
preference to cooperate with certain people over others on the basis of similarity of status and values (Lazarsfeld and
Merton, 1954; McPherson et al., 2001).2 Homophily of values or status makes cooperation and consensus within the network
more likely, and increases in-group solidarity, yet it prevents formation of cross-cutting ties, thus limiting networks to a partic-
ular social group (Oxendine, 2009; Rotolo, 2000; Desmond, 2012). Resource theory is also invoked, as lower strata lack the skills
and resources necessary to participate in social and political activities (Karakoc, 2013; Lancee and van de Werfhorst, 2012).
However, research in developmental economics leads to contrary expectations, as it provides evidence for the poor
forming wide informal networks and regularly turning to them for support. Adato et al. (2006) have demonstrated, using
quantitative and qualitative data from South Africa, that poor households have extensive and active social networks, which
they rely on frequently (see also Cleaver, 2005). Bratton (2008) showed that the poor in Africa attend local community meet-
ings more often than the wealthy, and Krishna (2008) identiﬁed a similar effect in India. Analysis of social support of single
mothers in the U.S. shows that low-wage and welfare-dependent households have large informal networks (Edin and Lein,
1997; Dominguez and Watkins, 2003). Note that all these examples are drawn from studies of unequal and polarized
contexts. We discuss this next.
2.1.1. The effect of context on network size
Previous studies have found that social and economic polarization depresses sociability and political involvement (Lancee
and van de Werfhorst, 2012; Pichler and Wallace, 2009; Solt, 2008). This effect is explained by increased status anxiety,
growing distrust, and a sense of unfairness, which discourage people from getting involved in participatory activities, espe-
cially with others who are of a different social status and have different resources ( Uslaner and Brown, 2005; Karakoc, 2013;
cf. Delhey and Dragovol, 2014). Although not directly discussed in the above-cited literature, postcommunist context can be
invoked here as an important complementary example of the eroding effect of polarization on network size. The repressive
communist regimes created an environment that was unfavorable for wide social network formation, and this was further
exacerbated by the experience of postcommunism, when unpredictability and inefﬁciency of institutions and lack of safety
and security hindered the capacity of citizens to form cooperative networks and develop trust that would stretch beyond
closest friends and family (Howard, 2003). Those who could not adapt to the social and economic changes were branded
as ‘‘losers of transition’’ and as such were stigmatized and socially excluded; these new divisions were based not only on
economic status, but also on geographic location (Brainerd, 1998; Ellman, 1997). The ideology of neoliberalism dominant
in the postcommunist countries in the 1990s undermined social cohesion and social solidarity (Coburn, 2000), which further
led to widespread status anxiety (Abbot and Wallace, 2013). In particular, post-Soviet countries, such as the Baltic states,
have a weak social solidarity structure and stand out in terms of having the greatest proportion of people that lack social
support and are not sufﬁciently integrated.
However, from the point of view of literature treating social networks as a source of resources it is likely that social and
economic polarization actually encourages participation in wider (although not necessarily more heterogeneous) networks.
When society is polarized resources are more likely to be distributed through informal connections, and these connections
are also used to limit resource ownership and use to one’s own group (Karstedt, 2003; Ledeneva, 1998). Therefore, although
context becomes unfavorable for cross-cutting network formation, it is conducive for the emergence of homogenous ties.
Commitment formation between members of narrow-trust networks helps to achieve greater certainty in transactions under
conditions of rivalry and inefﬁcient institutions (Cook et al., 2004).
Again, postcommunist Europe provides a useful example. Under communism, although formal participation was strictly
controlled by the state, closely knit informal relationships ﬂourished, as they formed the basis of a survival strategy, helping
to deal with supply constraints of consumer goods or access to services (Cook et al., 2004; Ledeneva, 1998; Rose, 1999). Due
to unfavorable regulatory conditions for business development and distortions of central planning, informal social relations
also became the basis for trading and exchange (Stark and Bruszt, 1998). This ‘‘culture of informality’’ has largely remained in
place in Central and Eastern Europe since the introduction of democracy and a market economy and was further stimulated
by the process of economic transformation (Kääriäinen and Lehtonen, 2006; Paldam and Svendsen, 2000). Market reforms
resulted in rising unemployment and withdrawal of welfare state provisions, leaving signiﬁcant parts of the population in
the void (Fajth, 1999), so large social networks were necessary as an important source of support.
Summing up, we have ambiguous expectations about the effect of context on network size: growing social and economic
polarization creates unfavorable conditions for participation in wide networks, thus we would expect that:
H1a. Income inequality and postcommunist status limit the size of networks.
At the same time, we recognize that the very same conditions require that people participate in extensive informal
networks to gain better access to unequally distributed resources, which results in a competing hypothesis:2 One must note that besides preference for interaction with people similar to oneself, homophily in social relations can also be endogenously induced and
arise, for example, due to features of social structure, i.e., people of similar characteristics attending the same schools, living in the same neighborhoods or being
members of the same clubs. It can also arise as a result of the psychological consequences of status deprivation, causing the poor to withdraw from their
previous social relationships, their networks thus becoming limited to those who are similarly socially estranged (Shaefer et al., 2011).
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It is also plausible that these mechanisms cancel each other out, thus we will observe no effect (Völker and Flap, 2001).
2.1.2. Does polarization affect the poor the most?
Social and political participation is stratiﬁed, and these differences have traditionally been attributed to disparities in
resources, such as skills or money (Verba et al., 1995). Research analyzing the effect of context on patterns of social capital
and participation shows that high economic inequality causes further differentiation between social groups in terms of levels
and patterns of participatory behavior. In particular, this stream of research argues that economic polarization limits political
and social participation, and that it does so the most among those with fewest resources and lowest social status (Lancee and
van de Werfhorst, 2012; Pichler and Wallace, 2009; Solt, 2008). This effect is attributed to the fact that when economic
inequality increases, even at the same level of economic development, the poor become poorer, so they lack resources to
socialize and participate in activities outside of the family. They are also demobilized by their perceptions of social injustice
and their own deprivation (Wuthnow, 2004). However, when resources are scarce and unequally distributed, the poor need
social support the most—relative to other groups in the same system and to similar groups in more equal systems—to com-
pensate for their underprivileged position. Paradoxically, the very same scarcity of resources that is likely to prevent them
from formal participation should encourage involvement in informal networks. Equally importantly, in unequal and
polarized contexts the wealthy are interested in maintaining networks that are narrow and homogenous, which helps to
limit out-ﬂow of resources (Karstedt, 2003; Ledeneva, 1998). Given that an unequal society represents a pyramid, with many
at the bottom and few at the top, when polarization increases, networks at the bottom of the social structure become larger
and networks at the top shrink.
Again, postcommunist context provides a complementary example of the effect of polarization on various groups’ net-
work size. Those who preserved their privileged position from the communist time retained their pre-1989 networks that
were subsequently used to take advantage of the unprecedented opportunities to accumulate wealth (Paldam and
Svendsen, 2000). However, the ‘‘transition losers’’ were also forced to maintain large networks, as they were unable to seek
support elsewhere (Fajth, 1999; Rose, 1999). We argue that while the privileged few at the top were interested in maintain-
ing limited and exclusive networks that were reinforcing their position of power, those at the bottom were forced to main-
tain networks that were as broad as possible in an attempt to compensate for the inefﬁciencies of the system and their own
deprived position. Therefore, we argue that while polarization indeed affects networks of the poor the most, this effect is
positive:
H2. Under high income inequality and in postcommunist countries networks of the poor are larger than networks of the
wealthy.2.2. Access to resources through social networks
The second part of our argument focuses on the process complementary to network formation and maintenance: the use
of networks to access substantive resources, such as money and employment. If the poor indeed have networks that are as
extensive as those of the wealthy, or more extensive, why do they remain so underprivileged? To answer this question we
refer to the same mechanisms presented in the case of network size: (i) psychological and resource-related factors differen-
tiate resources accessible by different social groups through their networks; (ii) these differences are magniﬁed in the
contexts where social, psychological, and economic distances between groups are large; and (iii) social and economic
polarization affects access to resources through networks.
2.2.1. The effect of context on access to resources through networks
Social polarization causes rivalry in access to resources; those at the top have relatively more to lose, and those at the
bottom more to gain than respective groups in more equal and less divided contexts. As a result, the accessing of resources
through networks intensiﬁes, as such informal methods allow better control of the in-ﬂow and out-ﬂow of resources. This is
what occurred in Russia after unemployment soared in the 1990s: the use of social networks became the most popular and
most efﬁcient way to ﬁnd employment (Clarke, 2000; Gerber and Mayorova, 2010). Informal networks also provide a better
connection to institutions and policymakers, as exempliﬁed by studies on the role of networks in shielding ﬁrms under eco-
nomic crisis in Malaysia (Johnson and Mitton, 2003) or in promoting business survival in African and postcommunist econ-
omies alike (Aidis et al., 2008; Fafchamps, 2000; Rogers, 2006). The ‘‘haves’’ turn to their networks when they need to
strengthen or defend their position, or simply to maintain the status quo. Through their networks, the poor access resources
that are in short supply. Qualitative studies from Africa demonstrate that networks of the poor are crucial for them to access
the most basic resources. In more equal, less polarized contexts, basic resources are more equally distributed, thus even
those at the bottom of the economic and social scale do not lack such resources, or they are readily available from relevant
institutions (Adato et al., 2006; Cleaver, 2005). In postcommunist countries networks of blat—informal social connections
used under communism to acquire privileged access to employment, goods, and services in short supply or to circumvent
formal procedures—remained for most of society the primary means of managing the uncertainties of the transition period
(Cook et al., 2004; Karstedt, 2003; Ledeneva, 1998). This brings us to the following hypothesis:
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While there are no comparative studies on the stratiﬁcation of access to resources through networks,3 there exists a
wealth of indirect evidence suggesting that the poor and those in socially isolated groups are unable to access resources through
their networks as much as other groups, because these networks are less successful and resource-rich than the networks of
those higher up in the social structure (Völker and Flap, 1999; Böhnke, 2008; DeFilippis, 2001).
Apart from homophily, which causes people to prefer interacting and sharing information and other resources with those
similar to themselves, the mechanisms of equity in network-based exchanges are at play here (Coleman, 1990; Lin, 2001). As
the economic distance between groups increases, the poor have less to offer, causing cross-cutting exchanges to become less
frequent. Therefore, in a relatively equal context the poor can access substantial resources through their networks, while in
an unequal context they cannot, because their networks, however extensive, are constrained to equally poor people, and the
network boundaries are rigid (Desmond, 2012). These networks do little to promote upward mobility, thus reinforcing social
divisions and patterns of social exclusion (Adato et al., 2006; Cleaver, 2005; DeFilippis, 2001; Edin and Lein, 1997). Moreover,
as inequality increases, so does the motivation of the elites to strategically use their networks to acquire narrowly available
and unequally distributed beneﬁts or privileges. This results in an accumulation of disadvantage, where the resource-poor
become relatively even poorer, while the wealthy take advantage of their powerful contacts to advance their interests
and further accumulate wealth and power (DiPrete and Eirich, 2006).
The postcommunist context generates similar expectations: rapid social and economic polarization and growing social
exclusion negatively affected the position of the poor in network exchanges (Harwin and Fajth, 1998). Those who lost
employment and experienced problems with adapting to the new reality (Brainerd, 1998; Ellman, 1997; Harwin and
Fajth, 1998), while the ‘‘winners’’ gained disproportionately strong control over the new political and economic order
(Hellman, 1998). Despite the signiﬁcance of blat relations in postcommunist Europe of the 1990s, Goodwin et al.’s (2001)
study reveals a reduction in perceived and received social network support experienced by workers in comparison with stu-
dents and entrepreneurs.
Therefore, although networks of the poor are marked by regular transactions (exchanges of goods and minor services)
between households, in polarized contexts they are not very efﬁcient in providing substantial support, such as a large loan
or help with ﬁnding employment (Adato et al., 2006; Amelina et al., 2004; Cleaver, 2005; Desmond 2012; Edin and Lein,
1997). Consequently, research on labor market returns to social networks documents more successful use of networks to ﬁnd
employment by those with higher social status (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Gerber and Mayorova, 2010). This is
because individual resource position is a close correlate of the position of the ‘‘go-between’’ person, which in turn is the
key predictor of the prestige and quality of a job acquired through that person (de Graaf and Flap, 1988; Völker and Flap,
1999). Similarly, information about a job opening is more likely to be provided by someone who is employed (and thus occu-
pies a higher social position) than by someone who is unemployed (Wahba and Zenou, 2005). Research on social support
arrives at similar conclusions. Access to household help and emotional support is provided regardless of one’s socioeconomic
position (Turner and Marino, 1994;Wellman andWorthley, 1990), but resources that are linked to one’s socioeconomic posi-
tion, such as substantial amounts of money, are provided more efﬁciently by those with higher social status and more
resources (Gerber and Mayorova, 2010; de Graaf and Flap, 1988).
Summing up, when inequality increases, both those at the bottom and at the top of the social structure have an incentive
to maintain large networks. However, when it comes to accessing resources through networks, polarization works to the dis-
advantage of the poorest group. This brings us to our ﬁnal hypothesis:
H4. Under high economic inequality and postcommunism, the poor are less able to access resources through their networks
than are the wealthy.3. Data and methods
To test our proposed hypotheses, we used the International Social Survey Programme 2001 ‘‘Social Networks’’ dataset, the
ﬁeldwork for which was conducted between 2000 and 2002.4 This dataset was designed speciﬁcally to investigate social net-
works, thus it allows the measuring of both the size of networks and access to resources through them across income groups
and social and economic contexts. Due to missing data, only 21 countries were included in our analysis, of which six are the
postcommunist CEE countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, and Slovenia. The number of interviews con-
ducted in most countries was between 1000 and 1500, which is representative at the country level.5 Because of the nested
structure of the data, we used hierarchical regressions, with respondents being nested within countries. We ﬁrst estimated indi-
vidual and contextual determinants of network size, with emphasis on the differentiating effect of income position conditioned3 To an extent, Böhnke (2008) captures network use by different income groups by introducing it in the ‘‘index of social (dis)integration,’’ along with contact
with friends/neighbors, dissatisfaction with social/family life, and perception of social integration.
4 Another ISSP Social Networks survey was conducted in 2009, but did not contain any questions about turning to networks for help.
5 The average minimum response rate calculated in accordance with the AAPOR methodology is 62% (Table B1 in the Appendix B).
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resource: money and employment. In the latter we also took into account the effect of context and controlled for network exten-
siveness. We used random intercept models with two-level variables and cross-level interactions.6 The models were estimated
using maximum likelihood estimations in GLLAMM software in Stata and the standard (adapt) function of adaptive quadrature
(Rabe-Hasketh and Skrondal, 2005).
3.1. Dependent variables
3.1.1. Network size
In this study we analyze the extensiveness of three types of social network: family and relatives, friends, and participation
in formal groups and organizations, which can be taken as a proxy for networks acquired through formal participation. Pre-
vious comparative studies of the effect of inequality on social capital typically used social contacts: frequency of informal
socializing or frequency of contacting, without distinguishing between family and friends, or limiting the studies to networks
including friends, colleagues, and neighbors only (Lancee and van deWerfhorst, 2012; Pichler andWallace, 2009). In our anal-
ysis we estimated the size of networks separately for family and for friends: family networks weremeasured as the number of
adult relatives (parents, brothers, sisters, and children, as well as other types of relatives, such as uncles or aunts, cousins, par-
ents-in-law, brothers- or sisters-in-law, nieces and nephews) a respondent indicated theywere in touchwith regularly or had
been in touch with in the previous four weeks. Friendship networks were reconstructed using three questions which asked
howmany close friends a respondent had in various contexts, such as theworkplace or neighborhood. Tomeasure formal net-
works, we built on previous research (Lancee and van deWerfhorst, 2012) by counting the number of formal groups and orga-
nizations whose activities a respondent had participated in at least once during the previous 12 months.
3.1.2. Access to resources
We can assess the usefulness of networks to access substantial resources by referring to questions in which respondents
indicated whom they would turn to (perceived help) or had turned to (received help) in the event of a hardship: if they
needed to borrow a substantial amount of money or were looking for a job. These correspond to what been termed, respec-
tively, instrumental and informational support (Matthews et al., 1999; Tardy, 1985).7 Both dimensions are popular in research
on social support and social networks, and they are found to contribute to the physical, psychological, and economic well-being
of those who rely on their networks for support (Edin and Lein, 1997; Uehara, 1990).
ISSP, 2001 respondents were askedwhom theywould turn to if they needed to borrow a substantial amount of money. The
range of answers offered included close and more distant family, friends, neighbors, and acquaintances, whom we coded as
‘‘1’’—social networks. Other options, such as professionals and institutions designed to assist people in economic hardship,
were coded as ‘‘0.’’ Respondents were also asked how they learned about their current job.8 Those who indicated family mem-
bers, relatives, friends, or acquaintances as the source of information were coded as ‘‘1,’’ the others as ‘‘0.’’9 As a result, we have
two indicators that capture access to two key resources: work and money. Even though one of the dependent variables describes
to whom peoplewould turn, and the other to whom they have turned for, respectively, money and employment, these questions
essentially capture the same phenomenon—accessing resources through social networks. Previous studies have found that peo-
ple form more or less stable networks in which they exchange different types of favors with each other in repeated interactions.
Thus, if a person indicates that he or she would turn to networks for money, there is reason to assume that such help either has
been or is likely to be provided (Edin and Lein, 1997; Dominguez and Watkins, 2003; Wellman and Worthley, 1990).
3.2. Independent variables
3.2.1. Individual level
3.2.1.1. Income position. One of the key hypotheses tested here is that in polarized contexts individuals who are disadvan-
taged economically use their social networks to compensate for their lack of economic capital; therefore for this study6 To test that the effect of income groups does not vary from country to country, we also estimated random slopes models for all dependent variables. In
neither case were the variances of slopes, as well as covariances between intercepts and slopes, statistically signiﬁcant (p > .01), which supports the use of
random intercept models.
7 Two other questions asked whom people would turn to if they were ill and needed help around the house or if they felt depressed and wanted to talk to
someone. The former is an example of instrumental support (next to lending money), while the latter represents emotional support. However, we had to
exclude these items from the analysis because an overwhelming majority of respondents in both scenarios pointed to relying on networks. As a result, variables
referring to these scenarios had almost no variance, which is consistent with earlier research on social support (Turner and Marino, 1994; Wellman and
Worthley, 1990).
8 A legitimate concern when using retrospective data is the possibility of recall error, which can result from memory lapses or from an intentional
misrepresentation of the past by respondents. However, recent labor market studies have found that the information provided by respondents regarding
employment events and the determinants of those events in their job histories and the prospective panel surveys is consistent and, thus, reliable (e.g., Paull,
2002). Moreover, we have no reason to suspect a social desirability bias with regard to learning about a job from networks. To ensure the robustness of the
results, only respondents who were employed at the time of the survey were included in the analysis.
9 In both cases the ‘‘0’’ category is heterogeneous, as it covers turning to institutions rather than a person, and turning to no one. It is important to retain both
categories in the analysis as a reference point for turning to networks, because each is likely to be an alternative to networks, depending on the contextual
factors that we cannot control for in our models.
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applied in constructing a widely used inequality indicator, percentile ratio, and grouped respondents according to whether their
household belonged to the bottom 25% of the national income share, the top 25% of national income share, or the 50% in
between. To establish the boundaries, we used external statistical sources (for a description of the methods and data used,
see Appendix A).
This method is superior to the traditionally used approach of grouping respondents into four or ﬁve equal categories
based on reported income, for two reasons. First, we avoid the item-non-response or possible sampling-related biases inher-
ent to survey data, because we do not rely on the incomplete and distorted distribution of income declared in the survey, but
instead use a reliable external statistical source. Second, reconstructed income groups are much more internally homoge-
nous than quartiles or quintiles of income, especially at the top end of the distribution, and especially in the more unequal
countries, and therefore better approximate social groups of similar status and resources. For example, if we had used the
traditional approach and simply divided respondents into quartiles, in Chile the cutoff point for the wealthiest group would
be 154,000 Chilean pesos, and the group with income above this amount of money would constitute 25% of the sample. With
our approach, the cutoff point for the high-income group is 500,000 pesos, and this group constitutes just 1% of the sample.
The size of the different groups varies from country to country. The average size of the lowest income group in all countries is
55.6% of the sample, the highest income group 9.6%, and the median income group 34.8% (see Table B1 in the Appendix B).113.2.2. Network size
We include all three types of networks discussed above as controls in the models explaining access to resources through
networks. This ensures that differences between groups and/or contexts in accessing resources through networks are not
solely due to different network size, but also indicate to what extent each type of network is relevant for acquiring access
to resources.3.2.3. Contextual effects
There are two main country-speciﬁc characteristics that are of interest from the point of view of our hypotheses: income
inequality and postcommunist status. To reveal the importance of economic polarization for network size and use, we look at
the effect of economic polarization, as measured by the Gini coefﬁcient from the Standardized World Income Inequality
Database (SWIID; see Solt, 2009). Postcommunist status is included in the models to account for the socio-psychological con-
sequences of rapid systemic transformation. To test for the effect of contextual characteristics on the behavior of particular
income groups, we add interaction terms. We include both contextual variables and interaction terms related to them in all
models simultaneously to assess the effect of one characteristic while controlling for the level of the other(s).3.3. Control variables
As noted earlier, social networks tend to arise spontaneously as a by-product of social roles and the contexts in which
individuals operate. To ensure we capture empirically the strategic component of network participation and use, we control
for a number of indicators related to such individual and social characteristics.3.3.1. Socioeconomic background
We account for whether respondents are economically active: economically inactive people are usually less involved in
social life and less likely to cooperate and interact with people outside of the household (Gesthuizen et al., 2009). Moreover,
they are less independent ﬁnancially, and thus their access to institutional resources is constrained (Pichler and Wallace,
2009). We also account for the sector of employment: we expect private sector employees to be less secure in their employ-
ment and more likely to be in informal or partially formal employment, especially in postcommunist countries. As in the case
of economically inactive people, if a person does not have a formal work contract, they may experience difﬁculty in receiving
institutional support, and so be forced to turn to their networks.
The remaining control variables are standard socioeconomic background indicators: gender, age, and education level
(whether a respondent has a university degree). To account for the structural conditions affecting both individual and con-
textual factors, we control for the real GDP per capita in U.S. dollars at base year 2000 (Gleditsch Expanded Trade and GDP
Data) (Teorell et al., 2011) in the models of network size and turning to networks for money, and for the level of unemploy-
ment in the models of using networks to ﬁnd a job.10 It would have been interesting to compare the results for both income- and employment-based social position measures, such as International Standard
Classiﬁcation of Occupations (ISCO) occupational groups. However, it was not possible to reconstruct social class from ISSP data because some key variables on
employment status were missing.
11 Since cutoff points for classifying respondents are somewhat arbitrary, and our approach is novel in research on the effect of economic position on network
formation and use, we have re-estimated all models using the log-transformed disposable household income of an individual (standardized within each
country). The results—available from the authors on request—are perfectly consistent with conclusions reached using income groups.
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4.1. Network size
Our literature review led to two conﬂicting hypotheses regarding the effect of social and economic inequality on network
size. Due to large polarization, the networks of people of low social status or low income should be smaller (H1a), yet at the
same time these individuals would need to participate in large networks in order to compensate for the adverse social and
economic conditions (H1b). Table 1 contains the results of regressions testing these hypotheses in models 1, 3, and 5. The
effects of both inequality and postcommunism on network size are statistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting that both mecha-
nisms are in play, canceling out each other: even though it is more difﬁcult to maintain large networks, people need them
more, so they invest more in maintaining them. Therefore, the overall network size does not change. The exception is the
negative effect of postcommunism on family network size. However, a closer look at the data reveals that the small family
networks in postcommunist countries should be linked to low life expectancy and birth rates. Respondents in postcommu-
nist countries indicated signiﬁcantly more often than other respondents that they had ‘‘no living relative of the kind,’’ i.e., no
father or mother, grandparents, sisters/brothers, children, or more distant relatives.
Recall that we posited that unfavorable conditions, such as social and economic polarization, would make the poor par-
ticipate in larger networks than the wealthy in an attempt to compensate for their underprivileged position. The results of
our analysis conﬁrm this expectation for the postcommunist context, but for income inequality this is conﬁrmed only in the
case of family networks.12 Since the conditional effects are difﬁcult to interpret solely on the basis of regression results, in
Table 2 we present conditional coefﬁcients for the effects that are statistically signiﬁcant. As we can see, even though in the
postcommunist countries family networks are smaller than in other countries, this holds least true for the poor. Moreover, while
the poor in the non-postcommunist countries are clearly disadvantaged in terms of the extensiveness of their friendship and
organizational networks in comparison with wealthier groups, in postcommunist countries their friendship networks are sig-
niﬁcantly larger than the networks of the wealthy. The difference in the effect of income group on organizational networks in
postcommunist countries is also far less pronounced than in the remaining countries (although low-income individuals still
belong to fewer organizations than high-income individuals, at p < .01). This indicates that the poor participate in large social
networks despite, or perhaps in response to, an unfavorable social context. Income inequality has a similar effect only on family
networks: under conditions of maximum equality (Denmark = 0)13 all income groups have family networks of the same size, but
in more unequal contexts the networks of the poor become much more extensive. This suggests that the poor see maintaining
ties with a large extended family as crucial for accessing needed help, which they are unlikely to reach through non-kinship ties
(Bubolz, 2001; Cattell, 2001).14 The fact that in the non-postcommunist context the lowest income group has smaller formal and
informal networks than wealthier groups, while in postcommunist countries these differences disappear, supports our propo-
sition that when polarization is greater, the poor intensify investment in network participation. They do so to the extent that
they are not disadvantaged in terms of network extensiveness compared with other groups.4.2. Reliance on networks to access resources
Now we turn to testing hypotheses 3 and 4: that increased social and economic polarization encourages the use of net-
works to access resources, but under these conditions the poor are less likely to access substantive resources through their
networks than the wealthy, all else being equal. Table 3 presents models for borrowing a substantial amount of money or
learning about an employment opportunity. These models are similar to those in Table 1, except that (i) the dependent
variables differ, and (ii) in the case of turning to networks to access information about a job, we control for the level of unem-
ployment instead of economic growth.15 Also, in order to make sure that the relationship between social position and reliance
on networks for help is not spurious, we control for network size.
First, we present unconditional regression models with country-level variables (models 1 and 3). The results are largely
supportive of our expectations (H3): income inequality and postcommunist context render people more likely to try to
access money through their networks, but only income inequality has such an effect on ﬁnding employment through net-
works. While we are unable to explain why we do not ﬁnd a similar effect of postcommunist status on job search, we suspect12 To make sure that the estimated effect of postcommunism is not capturing the effect of income inequality, and vice versa, we entered all four interaction
terms simultaneously. The results are almost identical with estimates from models where interaction terms were entered in pairs, i.e., those containing the
postcommunism variable separately from those containing the Gini coefﬁcient. The likelihood ratio test conﬁrms that adding interactions signiﬁcantly (at
p > 0.05) improves the model ﬁt in the case of family and friendship networks.
13 To facilitate the interpretation of the main and conditional effects, the Gini score was recoded so that Denmark (the most equal country in our sample)
received the score 0, while the range and distances between the scores of other countries remained the same. As a result, coefﬁcients for income groups in
models with interactions refer to Denmark (which also was scored ‘‘0’’ for non-postcommunist status).
14 While we have not investigated the exact composition and turnover within each group’s networks under different contexts, recent ethnographic research
shows that for the poorest citizens facing extreme adversity, such as eviction, family ties are insufﬁcient and must be supplemented with ‘disposable’ weak ties
formed with strangers (Desmond, 2012).
15 One might expect a relationship between current income level and whether a job was found through networks, thus raising the issue of causality in our
models. However, existing literature shows that ﬁnding employment through networks does not produce a higher wage or social status (Delattre and Sabatier,
2007; Mouw, 2003).
Table 1
Multilevel regressions of networks’ size on income groups, contextual characteristics and controls, N2 = 21 (unstandardised coefﬁcients, with SE in parentheses).
Family N1 = 22446 Friends N1 = 22429 Associations N1 = 22202
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE
Level 1
Low income (Ref.)
Middle income 0.059 (0.049) 0.166** (0.080) 0.264** (0.098) 0.388* (0.161) 0.164*** (0.019) 0.183*** (0.030)
High income 0.141 (0.081) 0.141 (0.132) 0.822*** (0.162) 0.984*** (0.265) 0.215*** (0.030) 0.210*** (0.050)
Works in private sector 0.049 (0.047) 0.043 (0.047) 0.350*** (0.095) 0.331*** (0.095) 0.152*** (0.018) 0.149*** (0.018)
Employed 0.675*** (0.049) 0.667*** (0.049) 1.623*** (0.098) 1.609*** (0.098) 0.154*** (0.018) 0.152*** (0.018)
Education: degree 0.330*** (0.061) 0.330*** (0.061) 0.039 (0.121) 0.027 (0.121) 0.389*** (0.023) 0.388*** (0.023)
Age 0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.028*** (0.003) 0.028*** (0.003) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001)
Sex 0.198*** (0.041) 0.197*** (0.041) 0.557*** (0.082) 0.558*** (0.082) 0.087*** (0.015) 0.087*** (0.015)
Level 2
Gini 0.040 (0.027) 0.045 (0.027) 0.074 (0.065) 0.068 (0.067) 0.018 (0.011) 0.018 (0.011)
Post-communism 1.165* (0.582) 0.995 (0.585) 1.812 (1.397) 2.161 (1.439) 0.126 (0.236) 0.169 (0.242)
GDP*1000 0.268 (0.355) 0.253 (0.356) 2.267** (0.852) 2.206* (0.876) 0.618*** (0.144) 0.608*** (0.147)
Cross-level interactions
Gini * middle income 0.015* (0.007) 0.012 (0.013) 0.001 (0.002)
Gini * high income 0.023 (0.013) 0.022 (0.027) 0.008 (0.005)
Postcommunism * middle income 0.303** (0.105) 0.855*** (0.210) 0.100* (0.039)
Postcommunism * high income 0.446* (0.186) 1.413*** (0.373) 0.217** (0.070)
Constant 6.390*** (1.069) 6.256*** (1.074) 1.999 (2.641) 0.826 (0.444)
Random-effects parameters
Constant 0.482 (0.151) 0.485 (0.153) 2.793 (0.873) 2.955 (0.924) 0.080 (0.025) 0.083 (0.026)
Residual 9.075 (0.086) 9.067 (0.086) 36.260 (0.343) 36.217 (0.342) 1.274 (0.012) 1.273 (0.012)
Log likelihood 56644.13 56634.391 72138.2 72125.688 34231.503 34223.753
*** p 6 0.001(two-tailed tests).
** p 6 0.01(two-tailed tests).
* p 6 0.05 (two-tailed tests).














Effects of income groups on networks’ size conditional on economic inequality and postcommunist status.
Low income Middle income High income
Family networks
GINI = 0 (Denmark) 0.28 0.20 0.26
GINI = 10 (Latvia) 0.17 0.10 0.04
GINI = 20 (Russia) 0.62 0.40 0.18
GINI = 30 (Brasil) 1.07 0.69 0.40
Non-postcommunist countries 0.47 0.47 0.37
Postcommunist 0.53 0.82 1.07
Friendship networks
Non-postcommunist countries 0.71 1.22 1.92
Postcommunist 2.87 2.53 2.67
Organisational networks
Non-postcommunist countries 0.18 0.37 0.47
Postcommunist 0.35 0.44 0.43
Note: Conditional effects are based on maximum likelihood linear regression models 2, 4 and 6 in Table 1, and were calculated while holding all other
variables at their sample means. Conditional effects in this table show the effect of belonging to a certain income group on the size of networks at certain
levels of inequality and postcommunist status. Only statistically signiﬁcant effects are presented.
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employed at the time of the survey. Given rapidly rising unemployment in the 1990s and few employment opportunities, our
sample most likely includes very few individuals who found employment during the process of transformation.
In the next steps we explored whether context—level of economic inequality and postcommunist status—differentiates
the accessing of resources through social networks among income groups (models 2 and 4 in Table 3).16 It turns out that
the effects are resource-speciﬁc. Postcommunist status tips the balance of relying on networks in favor of the wealthy for both
resources, whereas income inequality has such an effect only on the probability of turning to networks for money. In order to
facilitate the interpretation of the logistic regression coefﬁcients, in Table 4 we present marginal effects of the statistically sig-
niﬁcant coefﬁcients. The results reveal that under maximum equality (Denmark), income does not differentiate the probability
of accessing money through social networks (PP of 52–53% for all groups).17 However, as inequality grows, this picture changes:
all income groups are more likely to declare they would turn to networks for money, but this is especially so for the wealthy.
This difference is gradual, but it becomes evident when the most equal (Denmark) and most unequal (Brazil) contexts are com-
pared. In the latter context the poor are signiﬁcantly less likely to attempt to access money through their networks than the
middle and highest income groups (respective PPs are 80%, 83%, and 87%; all differences signiﬁcant at p 6 .1).
In postcommunist countries, all income groups are more likely to resort to networks when in need of money, but while in
non-postcommunist countries the poor rely on their networks formoney to the sameextent as other groups, in postcommunist
countries the practice is muchmore common among the middle and highest income groups (respective PPs are 76%, 81%, and
84%; all differenceswith the exception ofmiddle-high income signiﬁcant at p < .001). Turning to networks to ﬁnd a job on aver-
age does not differ across income groups in postcommunist and other countries. However, we observe a clear conditioning
effect of inequality: in countries with more equal income distribution, the poor turn to networks to ﬁnd employment more
often than thewealthy,which is likely to reﬂect the low-skilled andoften short-termnature of theirwork.However, as inequal-
ity grows, the overall informality and accessing of job information through networks increases disproportionally for the
wealthy. These results are generally in accordancewith hypothesis 4: with growing social and economic polarization the poor
lose their advantage over the wealthy in terms of the probability of accessing employment information through networks and
become disadvantaged in terms of the probability of accessing a substantial amount of money through their networks.
Our analyses so far have conﬁrmed that under social and economic polarization the poor tend to have larger networks than
wealthier groups, but they are generally not able to access resources through them to the same extent as the wealthy, all else
being equal. However, since the poor have larger networks, it is possible that the overall support provided by these networks is
the same as or even larger than that provided by the networks of thewealthy. To address this issue,we calculated by howmuch
the average size of thenetworks of people in the lowest incomegroupwouldhave to increaseor decrease in order to achieve the
same probability of accessing resources as the middle- and high-income groups. We only looked at networks of family and
friends, as organizational networks turned out to be irrelevant for accessing resources. Also,we did not look at the conditioning
effect of economic inequality on job search through networks, as it does not differentiate between groups (Table 2).
The results of our simulations are very telling (see Table B3 in the Appendix B). It is clear that despite maintaining wider
family and friendship networks, under conditions of social and economic polarization the lowest income group is signiﬁcantly
disadvantaged in terms of being able to rely on networks to access resources. For example, in postcommunist countries the
lowest income group would need an increase in network size of almost 15 family members or more than 26 friends to have16 The likelihood ratio test conﬁrms that in regard to turning to networks for money, the model with interactions ﬁts the data signiﬁcantly (p < 0.01) better
than the model without interactions.
17 The statistical signiﬁcance of differences between regression coefﬁcients, including differences between the marginal effects of interactions of income
groups with postcommunist status, was tested using post-estimation Wald tests (commands ‘‘test’’ and ‘‘lincom’’ in Stata).
Table 3
Multilevel logistic regressions of accessing resources through networks on income groups, contextual characteristics and controls, N2 = 21 (unstandardised coefﬁcients, with SE in parentheses).
Job N1 = 11851 Money N1 = 21387
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
b SE b SE b SE B SE
Level 1
Income group (Ref. cat. Low income)
Middle income 0.087 (0.045) 0.035 (0.077) 0.002 (0.037) 0.166** (0.060)
High income 0.163* (0.072) 0.262* (0.124) 0.038 (0.056) 0.212* (0.098)
Networks
Family 0.020** (0.007) 0.020** (0.007) 0.020*** (0.005) 0.021*** (0.005)
Friendship 0.014*** (0.003) 0.014*** (0.003) 0.019*** (0.003) 0.019*** (0.003)
Organisations 0.000 (0.017) 0.001 (0.017) 0.003 (0.014) 0.003 (0.014)
Works in private sector 0.263*** (0.043) 0.263*** (0.043) 0.043 (0.035) 0.039 (0.035)
Employed 0.383*** (0.038) 0.379*** (0.038)
Education: degree 0.416*** (0.054) 0.412*** (0.054) 0.073 (0.046) 0.073 (0.046)
Age 0.011*** (0.002) 0.011*** (0.002) 0.032*** (0.001) 0.032*** (0.001)
Sex 0.218*** (0.039) 0.218*** (0.040) 0.373*** (0.031) 0.375*** (0.031)
Level 2
GINI 0.045*** (0.008) 0.046*** (0.012) 0.050*** (0.015) 0.047*** (0.015)
Post-communist 0.276 (0.222) 0.210 (0.239) 1.103*** (0.315) 0.921** (0.322)
GDP*1000 0.039* (0.020) 0.039* (0.020)
Unemployment rate 2.674 (2.656) 2.587 (2.898)
Cross-level interactions
GINI*middle income 0.010 (0.006) 0.009 (0.005)
GINI*high income 0.003 (0.012) 0.020 (0.011)
Post-Communist*middle income 0.128 (0.097) 0.374*** (0.082)
Post-communist*high income 0.349* (0.159) 0.532*** (0.148)
Constant 0.913*** (0.223) 0.928*** (0.258) 0.626 (0.595) 0.705 (0.592)
Random-effects parameters
Residual 0.193 (0.044) 0.171 (0.056) 0.148 (0.045) 0.144 (.046)
-log likelihood 7700.9717 7697.0144 12912.94 12897.001
*** p 6 0.001(two-tailed tests).
** p 6 0.01(two-tailed tests).
* p 6 0.05 (two-tailed tests).














Predicted probabilities of accessing resources by income groups conditioned by economic inequality and postcommunist status.
Low income Middle income High income
Job
GINI = 0 (Denmark) 0.35 0.35 0.31
GINI = 10 (Latvia) 0.45 0.43 0.42
GINI = 20 (Russia) 0.56 0.51 0.54
GINI = 30 (Brasil) 0.66 0.60 0.65
Money
GINI = 0 (Denmark) 0.53 0.52 0.52
GINI = 10 (Latvia) 0.63 0.64 0.66
GINI = 20 (Russia) 0.73 0.75 0.78
GINI = 30 (Brasil) 0.80 0.83 0.87
Non-postcommunist countries 0.59 0.57 0.59
Postcommunist 0.76 0.81 0.84
Note: Predicted probabilities are based on logistic regression models 2 and 4 in Table 3, and were obtained using the gllapred option in Stata. The marginal
effects are calculated while holding all other variables in the model at their means. Only statistically signiﬁcant effects are presented.
228 N. Letki, I. Mierina / Social Science Research 49 (2015) 217–233the same probability of accessingmoney through networks as themiddle income group does, and an increase of more than 16
family members or 29 friends to have the same probability as the highest income group. A similar effect is observable for
income inequality, as under high inequality the lowest income group needsmore relatives and friends in the network to attain
the sameprobability of accessingmoneyor information about a job opening throughnetworks as themiddle- andhigh-income
groups. In the caseofﬁndingemployment throughnetworks, themechanism isdifferent, as thepoor in thenon-postcommunist
context have a higher probability of learning about a job through a network than do the middle- and high-income groups,
keeping the network size constant, but in the postcommunist context they lose this advantage.184.3. Robustness of results
As noted by Maas and Hox (2004), multilevel models can sometimes provide inconsistent results. Hence, we subjected
our results to a number of robustness tests. First, in addition to a simple multivariate hierarchical model, we also tested
our hypotheses in a conditional logistic regression model. The conditional maximum likelihood estimates were nearly iden-
tical to the maximum likelihood estimates for the random intercept models. Second, since there are only 21 level-2 obser-
vations in our sample, and the 3 contextual characteristics (Gini, GDP or unemployment rate, and postcommunist status) are
relatively closely correlated, our concern was collinearity. All models presented above were also estimated with the level of
unemployment instead of GDP (for the borrowing models), or GDP instead of level of unemployment (for the job models), yet
the results were not affected.
To ensure that the binary variable we used to capture the socio-psychological polarization in postcommunist countries
was not in fact capturing institutional factors strongly associated with the postcommunist transition, such as the level of
corruption or government effectiveness, we re-estimated all models with the variable measuring quality of government19
instead of GDP or unemployment rate (while retaining the Gini coefﬁcient, postcommunist status, and interactions with income
groups). The results (available from the authors, on request) are virtually identical, except that the negative effect of postcom-
munist status on the size of family networks is rendered insigniﬁcant.
Finally, to test for the sensitivity of Gini in capturing levels of inequality in the bottom and top part of the distribution, we
replaced it with a measure of inequality below the median (10/50 percentile ratio) and above the median (90/50 percentile
ratio) and interacted it with an equalized household income measure (Lancee and van de Werfhorst, 2011).20 The condition-
ing effect of inequality at the top and bottom end of the distribution on the effect of income is virtually identical with the results
from the models in Tables 1 and 3, where Gini was used. The only difference concerns the model explaining the likelihood of
turning to networks for money: in this case interaction between income and inequality below the median has a very strong
positive effect, which is fully consistent with our earlier ﬁndings. However, interaction between income and inequality above
the median is statistically insigniﬁcant. This indicates that only the growth of inequality in the bottom part of the income dis-
tribution makes poorer individuals comparatively less likely to use networks to access money. Overall, the robustness tests give
us full conﬁdence in our model speciﬁcations, our ﬁndings, and their interpretation.18 Yet again, the ‘‘advantage’’ of the poor over the wealthy under low inequality refers to the probability of ﬁnding employment, not to the quality of this
employment.
19 This is measured by a combined score of the six World Bank Quality of Government indicators (Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption) for the year preceding the year when the ISSP Social Networks survey was conducted
in a given country. Data taken from Teorell et al. (2011).
20 Results available from the authors on request. Authors’ calculations of percentile ratios are based on equalized disposable household income of an
individual (HIDI) (see Appendix A), using micro-data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS, 2005), The European Union Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions (EU SILC, 2005) (Latvia, Cyprus, Poland), and National Statistical Ofﬁces (Australia, Chile). In cases where the information for the exact year of the
ISSP ﬁeldwork was not available, the value to be used was calculated as the weighted average between the two nearest data points, considering their
‘‘closeness’’ to the ISSP data (Italy, Hungary, the United States, Great Britain, Denmark).
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Analyses presented in this paper shed new light on how the size of social networks and their use to access resources are
dependent on conventional capital, and how this relationship is mediated by contextual characteristics. Our approach is
unique in that we focused on the size of networks and reliance on them for resources rather than on sociability or partici-
pation, and that we deﬁned social position in terms of relative income position. The picture that emerged from our analyses
is even more complex than we hypothesized based on the existing literature and research. We have demonstrated that the
size of networks and the probability that particular income groups will turn to them for help are inﬂuenced by context, but
are also resource speciﬁc. At the same time, our models unanimously show that when the context becomes adverse, poor
people become disadvantaged in terms of accessing needed resources through their networks. Even if in objective terms
the probability that the poor will turn to their networks for help increases, relative to other groups it decreases. To get
the same support from their networks as those who are more resource-rich, they would require larger friendship or family
networks. This is why under conditions of high social and economic polarization the economically disadvantaged tend to
maintain larger networks.
The mechanism we tested concerned economic and/or social polarization breaking cross-cutting ties—for strategic or
psychological reasons—among the economically disadvantaged and other social groups. The tests we performed provide
empirical evidence that social and psychological mechanisms shape networks and their use to access resources. The
results showed that economic inequality and postcommunist transition affect networks and their use in the same way,
although largely independently of each other. Those two factors affect a particular group’s behavior even after controlling
for structural features (the level of economic development or unemployment), which supports our interpreting these
indicators as capturing different types of societal polarization. We have shown that inequality is conducive to informal
network use, yet its effect on the use of networks to access resources differs according to income position. Inequality tips
the balance of network use in favor of the wealthy, allowing them to gain further advantages over the rest of the popu-
lation. We have presented an example of the socio-psychological polarization in postcommunist countries, resulting from
transitional reforms and the domination of neoliberal ideology, leading to stigmatization and marginalization of the poor
and corrupt practices among the elites. Here also the poor turned out to participate in networks that were at least as
extensive as those of the wealthy, but were relatively disadvantaged in terms of capacity to access resources through these
networks. We also ruled out the possibility that different levels of network use to access resources by different social
groups results from the fact that they participate in networks of different size. This allows us to conclude that we have
identiﬁed the effect of social and economic polarization on social network capital of different income groups. Given that
since 2001, when the ISSP data were collected, postcommunist societies have further polarized, and a wide economic crisis
has affected countries in Europe and beyond, the disparities in social network capital described in this paper are likely to
have further deepened.
The described relationship among income position, capacity to use networks to access resources, and social context
contributes to our understanding of why economically disadvantaged groups get locked in a vicious circle of poverty and
marginalization. They are resource-poor and in need of resources, but they have little to offer in an exchange and/or are dis-
regarded and marginalized because of their social status, which restricts them to searching for help within the closest circle
of family and friends, who are equally resource poor. Even if they form new ties speciﬁcally to help them cope with adverse
circumstances, these weak ties are not cross-cutting, but limited to individuals who are as isolated and economically des-
perate as they are themselves (Desmond, 2012). Thus, they suffer from a ‘‘triple exclusion’’: being disadvantaged not only
in public and market transactions, but also in private transactions (Amelina et al., 2004; Cleaver, 2005). Unless some
exogenous factors are activated, such as institutional assistance to the poorest to help them escape their underprivileged
and stigmatized position, this vicious circle will not be broken. While the poor become even more disadvantaged, wealthier
groups consolidate and institutionalize their privileged position, also through reliance on informal social networks. These
conclusions are particularly important in the context of decreased welfare spending in times of economic crisis and ﬁnancial
austerity.
Our ﬁndings have powerful policy implications. They are concurrent with the arguments emphasizing the importance of
institutional arrangements for alleviating social exclusion (Amelina et al., 2004; Cleaver, 2005; Gallie, 2004; Taylor-Gooby,
2013). Policy efforts should focus on providing well-targeted transfers that will enable the distance between particular
groups to be reduced, thus crowding in social support (Chantarat and Barrett, 2012). Otherwise, the unequal distribution
of social network capital resulting from social and economic exclusion will continue to reinforce social polarization and
fragmentation.Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Christian Bjørnskov, Henryk Doman´ski, Maciej Górecki, Daiga Kamera¯de, Tim Reeskens, Eric
Uslaner, Herman van de Werfhorst and the SSR reviewers for their comments on previous drafts of the paper, and Paula
Kukołowicz for research assistance. This research was supported by GINI: Growing Inequalities Impacts Project (Work
Package 5) and ERC StG ‘‘Public Goods through Private Eyes’’ Project (grant number 240830). Earlier versions of the paper
were presented at GINI Year 1 Conference, February 4–5, 2011, Milan, and ECPR 2011 Conference, August 24–27, Reykjavik.
Table B1
Key predictor variables, dependent variables, and response rates by countries and country groups.













% % Mean Mean Mean % % %
(0–1) (0–1) (0–100) (0–10) (0–30) (0–7) (0–1) (0–1) (0–100)
Scale
Country average 9.6 55.6 31.9 6 7.6 0.9 63.8 39.1 61.8
Post-com. average 8.4 56.0 30.2 5.4 6.6 0.4 71.3 40.8 –
Other countries average 10.0 55.4 32.5 6.3 8.1 1.1 60.8 38.4 –
Czech Republic 25.2 17.5 25.5 5.4 8.1 0.8 70.4 45.2 66.1
Hungary 2.2 82.1 27.7 5.5 4.9 0.3 56.7 50.9 59.7
Latvia 3.0 55.5 33.2 4.3 4.3 0.3 70.8 43.5 52.7
Poland 8.5 47.7 28.6 5.9 7.0 0.3 71.7 39.2 65.3
Russia 1.8 75.6 43.4 5.0 5.5 0.2 85.8 26.7 41.3
Slovenia 9.9 57.5 24.9 6.4 11.0 0.8 72.6 39.2 65.7
Australia 19.2 46.1 31.7 5.8 9.7 1.6 68.4 27.5 –
Austria 5.1 62.0 25.7 5.6 8.5 0.9 58.3 24.1 65.6
Brasil 1.0 92.4 52.3 8.3 9.2 0.6 64.9 69.3 –
Canada 6.3 71.6 31.5 7.1 8.6 2.0 47.6 34.7 41.2
Chile 0.8 90.6 51.3 7.6 5.3 0.6 71.7 57.0 66.8
Cyprus 10.0 28.4 27.0 6.8 6.1 0.6 49.1 50.3 78.0
Denmark 24.8 38.8 22.6 5.5 8.4 1.3 42.0 27.3 95.1
Finland 6.9 58.6 24.6 5.4 5.6 1.4 55.3 24.4 57.8
France 18.4 33.1 27.8 5.9 7.4 1.1 55.1 36.9 14.5
Great Britain 6.6 48.6 34.5 5.3 9.4 1.1 57.5 29.8 58.7
Italy 17.6 33.2 33.3 6.0 5.0 0.7 68.9 47.1 92.7
Norway 7.9 53.4 25.0 6.2 11.2 1.4 55.1 27.8 63.7
Spain 1.8 76.6 33.6 6.5 5.9 0.4 75.0 47.6 95.3
Switzerland 10.6 45.6 27.6 5.3 8.9 1.2 70.4 28.2 31.8













N. Letki, I. Mierina / Social Science Research 49 (2015) 217–233 231Appendix A. Methods and data used to deﬁne income groups
To estimate income thresholds to be applied to respondents in the ISSP datasets we referred to external sources. The
data used were taken from available sources: the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS, 2005), The European Union Statistics
on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC, 2005) (Latvia, Cyprus), and National Statistical Ofﬁce (Chile). In cases where
the information for the exact year of the ISSP ﬁeldwork was not available, the value to be used was calculated as the
weighted average between the two nearest data points, considering their ‘‘closeness’’ to the ISSP data (Australia, Austria,
Hungary, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Finland). When external data were available only for one year, the value was adjusted
on the basis of the change in average wages during the period of time between the ISSP ﬁeldwork and the available
external data according to ofﬁcial statistics (Czech Republic, Russia, Brazil, Chile, Cyprus, Latvia, Italy, France). Usually
the difference was up to two years, with the greatest differential being ﬁve years (Brasil, Latvia, Cyprus). In the case
where ISSP data on gross rather than net income were collected (Australia, United States, Canada, Great Britain, Norway,
Denmark, Finland), the data were adjusted by subtracting the proportion that accounts for direct taxes and social
contributions.
First, using the data described above, we calculated the equivalized disposable household income of an individual (HIDI)
for every household in every country, applying the Eurostat approach. This means that the total household income after
taxes and contributions was divided by the weighted number of household members. In most of the countries included
in the analysis income was provided in the dataset as a continuous variable. In countries were income was provided in inter-
vals, it was recalculated to the middle of the interval; in case the respondent had marked the highest interval, we assumed
that it is the lowest number of that interval +30%. For most countries we applied standard Eurostat weights: 1.0 to the ﬁrst
adult, 0.5 to the second and each subsequent person aged 18 or over, 0.3 to each child aged under 18. When data on house-
hold members under 18 were not available, which was the case for Chile, we provided altered weights: 1.0 to the ﬁrst person,
0.5 to the second person, 0.3 to each subsequent household member. In the next step, households were sorted according to
their HIDI, and thresholds for the bottom 25% income share and top 25% income share were identiﬁed. In the ﬁnal step, we
applied thresholds between the lowest and middle, and middle and highest income groups estimated in the previous step
(using external data) to the ISSP Social Networks equivalised household income variable (calculated using the Eurostat
approach described above). As a result we were able to group ISSP Social Networks respondents according to whether their
households were in the bottom 25% share of the total national income (the poorest households), the top 25% share (the
wealthiest households), or in between.Appendix B
See Tables B1–B3.Table B2







Borrowing r (country level) 0.232 0.288 0.148
- loglikelihood 17285.88 12919.751 12912.94
Job r (country level) 0.351 0.340 0.193
- loglikelihood 9558.7134 7707.6084 7700.9717
Family networks r (individual level) 0.822 0.852 .4815426
r (country level) 9.260 9.075 9.075
- loglikelihood 71539.339 56650.024 56644.13
Friendship networks r (individual level) 4.088 4.149 2.793
r (country level) 37.704 36.260 36.260
- loglikelihood 91326.224 72142.315 72138.2
Organisational networks r (individual level) .270 0.255 0.079
r (country level) 1.289 1.274 1.274
- loglikelihood 43095.186 34243.643 34231.503
Table B3
Difference in network size the lowest income group needs to have the same probability of accessing resources through networks as the middle and high income
groups.
Family networks Friendship networks
Middle–low income High–low income Middle–low income High–low income
Money
Postcommunist 14.750* 26.495* 16.303* 29.284*
Non-postcommunist 3.062 1.172 3.384 1.295
Job
Postcommunist 0.005 7.106 0.007 10.151
Non-postcommunist 6.404* 10.364* 9.148* 14.805*
Money
GINI = 0 (Denmark) 2.414 1.724 2.669 1.905
GINI = 10 (Latvia) 1.771 7.906* 1.957 8.738*
GINI = 20 (Russia) 5.956 17.536* 6.583 19.381*
GINI = 30 (Brasil) 10.141 27.165* 11.209 30.025*
Note: The differences were calculated while holding all other parameters at their sample means.
 p 6 0.1.
* p 6 0.05.
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